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Failure to convert computer-identified possible kidney
paired donation (KPD) exchanges into transplants has
prohibited KPD from reaching its full potential. This
study analyzes the progress of exchanges in moving
from ‘‘offers’’ to completed transplants. Offers were
divided into individual segments called 1-way
transplants in order to calculate success rates. From
2007 to 2014, the Alliance for Paired Donation
performed 243 transplants, 31 in collaboration with
other KPD registries and 194 independently. Sixty-one
of 194 independent transplants (31.4%) occurred via
cycles, while the remaining 133 (68.6%) resulted from
nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD)
chains. Thirteenof 35 (37.1%)NEADchainswith at least
three NEAD segments accounted for 68% of chain
transplants (8.6 tx/chain). The ‘‘offer’’ and 1-way
success rates were 21.9 and 15.5%, respectively. Three
reasons for failure were found that could be prospec-
tively prevented by changes in protocol or software:
positive laboratory crossmatch (28%), transplant cen-
ter declined donor (17%) and pair transplanted outside
APD (14%). Performing a root cause analysis on failures
inmoving fromoffer to transplant has allowed the APD
to improve protocols and software. These changes
have improved the success rate and the number of
transplants performed per year.
Abbreviations: AHRQ, Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality; APD, Alliance for Paired Donation; DPD,
domino paired donation; KPD, kidney paired donation;
MRF, modifiable reason for failure; NEAD chain,
nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor chain;
NEADseg, nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor
segment; NDD, nondirected donor; SR, success rate;
Tx, transplant; XM, crossmatch
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Introduction
Kidney paired donation (KPD) is an effective means of
overcoming immunological barriers to living donor trans-
plantation (1–12). The competition engendered by various
paired donation registries has led to unique strategies and
innovations (13). However, in order for KPD to reach its full
potential in the United States, it has been suggested that
larger pools, perhaps under a single national registry, would
be beneficial (9,13–15). If a strong national registry is to be
created, the best strategies from each registry should be
adopted. This poses a challenge, however, as variations in
outcome reporting make direct comparisons difficult.
Though progress has been made, matching algorithms
continue to generate potential exchanges that ultimately
fail to produce transplants. KPD registries have adopted one
of two systems to deal with this problem: either attempt to
rapidly move through offers until a success is found, or
spend time creating more robust offers that have a higher
likelihood of succeeding. Few programs have reported on
this aspect of KPD (9). KPD registries that operate within a
single center/system have fewer communication and
financial barriers so that less time and effort are wasted
in failed offers (16,17). For those registries that oversee
multiple independent centers, sharing information requires
the coordinated efforts of multiple individuals, and more
time and energy are expended on failed offers in multi-
institutional KPD programs than in those that operate as a
single center.
Nondirected donors (NDD) have been utilized to start chains
of KPD transplants that can be either simultaneous, called
domino paired donation (DPD), or nonsimultaneous, called
nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chains.
In NEAD chains, a NDD starts a segment of a nonsimulta-
neous series of transplants that ends with a bridge donor,
who can start another segment to continue the NEAD chain
at a later date (18). DPD eliminates the possibility of a bridge
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donor reneging by creating simultaneous KPD chains that
end with a donation to a patient on the waiting list (8,19).
The pros and cons of these approaches have been
evaluated using simulated pools with real patient data,
but actual experience is lacking (20–23).
Since its inception, the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD)
has allowed simple cycles and NEAD chains to freely
compete within its optimization algorithm and in converting
computer-identified possible transplants, or ‘‘offers,’’ into
completed transplants. In this study, we reviewed the
efficacy of the APD matching system in converting
computer-identified cycle and chain offers into completed
transplants. Recognizing the observational nature of the
evolution of theAPD’s approach, the goals of the studywere
to: (i) determine theorganization’s success rate over time; (ii)
discern the reasons for failure to progress from an offer to
successful transplants within different historical eras; (iii)
compare the utility of cycles and chains of varying lengths;
and (iv) correlate success rates with changes to matching
software and procedures. We have also endeavored to
delineate factors other than thematching algorithm, such as
tissue typing standardization and communication between
the APD and centers, that have impacted the matching
process. The identified reasons for failure and the strategies
employed to overcome these failures raise important
practical and philosophical questions for discussion regard-
ing future policy decisions for KPD in the United States.
Materials and Methods
The efficacy of the APD in converting proposed computer-identified kidney
transplants into completed kidney transplants was analyzed from Janu-
ary2007 throughAugust2014 (IRBapproved, #104347).Datawascollected in
Excel, andstatistical analysiswasperformedwith IBMSPSSStatisticsversion
19.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). p-values were determined using x2 tests.
Utilizing an optimization algorithm developed by Roth, S€onmez, and €Unver,
the APD generates solutions of cycles and NEAD segments restricted to a
length of 2-, 3-, 4-, or unrestricted exchanges to optimize the quantity and
quality of possible transplants (24). See Table 1 for a list of terms.
The process of converting computerized match runs into transplants
involves four steps. First, the APD software identifies all immunologically
feasible 1-way exchanges among the enrolled incompatible pairs, creating a
compatibility matrix of possible 1-way exchanges. This compatibility matrix
was initially based on ABO compatibility and a virtual HLA crossmatch based
on center-reported specificities, but was later updated to include
discretionary exclusion factors. The second step involves the APD software
assigning a point score to the compatible 1-way exchanges using a scoring
rubric (Table S1). The third step optimizes these 1-way exchanges into an
overall solution comprised of cycles and NEAD segments according to the
pre-determined maximum number of exchanges allowed per cycle or
segment. At this point a centralized tissue-typing laboratory performs a
screening crossmatch to eliminate false negative virtual crossmatch results.
Center reported calculated PRA (cPRA) was introduced in October 2009 in
accordance with UNOS specifications. The fourth step involves offering out
the proposed exchanges (referred to subsequently as offers) in the
optimized solution to be reviewed by transplant centers. Centers are then
required to perform a confirmatory crossmatch to ensure HLA compatibility
before the transplant proceeds.
When NDDs are entered into the pool, they initiate NEAD chain segments
(NEADseg) that end in bridge donors. These bridge donors are re-entered into
the pool individually in an equivalent fashion to NDDs to create another
NEADseg. These segments build upon one another to create full NEAD
chains. A NEAD chain ends when a bridge donor donates to the deceased
donor waiting list or is withdrawn from the pool.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of converting computer-identified
matches into completed transplants, each offer was divided into individual
(1-way) exchanges. For instance, a 3-way cycle is composed of three 1-way
exchanges, and a NEADseg-3 chain is composed of three 1-way exchanges
with an overhanging bridge donor. The success rate was calculated by
evaluating the conversion rate of cycles and chain segment offers generated
from the optimized solution (offer success rate), and by evaluating the
conversion rate of the 1-way exchanges that comprised these offers (1-way
success rate). Identifying the successful conversion of both 1-ways and
entire cycles/NEADsegs was necessary because, in the case of NEADsegs, an
offer has the potential to generate some transplants but fail further down the
chain. These partially failed segments still result in a bridge donor, so the
chain can be continued at a later date. If any transplantswere performed as a
result of a NEADseg offer, the offer was considered successful even though
some 1-ways within the offer may have been unsuccessful.
Next, reasons for failure were evaluated to determine the most common
causes of an offer failing to result in transplants. It is important to note that a
Table 1: List of key terminology
Exchange A proposed kidney transplant between a donor of one incompatible pair with a recipient of a different
incompatible pair.
1-way Synonymous with exchange. Full term would be 1-way exchange.
Cycle A set of N exchanges in a closed loop found by the matching algorithm in which each recipient receives a kidney
from a donor within the cycle.
NEAD segment A set of N exchanges started by a nondirected donor (NDD) or bridge donor (BD) that ends either in a bridge donor
or in donation to the deceased donor waiting list.
NEAD chain The accumulation of multiple NEAD segments linked together through BD’s and initiated by a NDD.
DPD A set of N exchanges started by an NDD that occur simultaneously and ends with donation to the deceased donor
waiting list.
Offer A NEAD segment or cycle that has been presented to transplant centers for consideration.
1-way success rate The number of exchanges completed divided by the total number of exchanges presented in offers.
Offer success rate The number of offers containing at least 1 successful transplant divided by the total number of offers.
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1-way could fail to culminate in a transplant due to a specific reason, or it
could fail due to dependency on a preceding 1-way being completed. We
identified these as ‘‘failures of dependency,’’ which were excluded from the
analysis of reasons for failure so that we could determine the relative
incidence of specific reasons for failure. The 1-way and offer success rate
calculations did incorporate failures of dependency. Reasons for failurewere
not available for 2007, so this analysis consists only of offers made from
January 2008 to August 2014.
Results
Offers, transplants, and success rates of cycles and
NEAD chains
Seventy-six transplant centers across 27 states entered
incompatible pairs in the APD registry. Forty-three centers
in 24 states performed at least one APD transplant. The
pool size increased steadily from 81 in January 2007 to 145
in January 2009, and then remained between 150 and 185
from 2009–present. The percent of the pool with a PRA
80% increased from 34% in 2007 to 49% in 2014
(Figure 1, p< 0.001).
As of September 2014, the APD performed 243 trans-
plants, both independently and in conjunction with several
other KPD registries. This analysis consists of the 194
transplants performed from 98 offers made exclusively by
the APD from January 2007 through August 2014. Sixty-
one of 194 (31.4%) transplants were achieved through
cycles (Figure 2A). NEAD chains accounted for 133 of 194
(68.6%) transplants (Figure 2b). The percentage of
transplanted patients with a PRA 80% increased from
15.4% in 2007 to 36.0% in 2014 (Figure 1). Each chain
was composed of various length NEAD segments
(NEADseg-N); successful segments varied between one
and seven transplants (NEADseg-1 to NEADseg-7). These
NEAD segments, linked together through bridge donors,
were part of 35 cumulative chains ranging from 1 to 16
transplants (Figure 2C). This study provides failure
analysis only for 133 NEAD chain transplants facilitated
solely by the APD. However, the APD worked with other
KPD registries to achieve an additional 39 transplants so
that the NEAD chains discussed achieved 164 transplants
overall, leading to an average NEAD chain length of 4.6
transplants/chain. It is noteworthy that 13 of these 35
NEAD chains were composed of three or more NEADsegs
(8.6 transplants/chain average), and these very long
chains were responsible for 112 of 164 (68.3%) trans-
plants through chains.
A total of 447 offers weremade exclusively by the APD and
contained 1255 1-ways. The offer success rate was 21.9%,
and the 1-way success rate was 15.5% (Figure 3). The
optimization algorithm allowed cycles and NEADsegs to
freely compete in a ‘‘natural selection’’ process that sought
only to maximize the quantity or quality of transplants
offered. Of the 447 computer-identified offers, 173 (38.7%)
offers were cycles and 256 (61.3%) were NEADsegs
(Table S2). Though many were offered, only one cycle of
length four or greater was completed (6-way). The majority
(115) of the 133 transplants from NEAD chains were
produced from NEADseg -1, -2, -3, and -4, while 18 were
produced from NEADseg-5, -6, and -7. Several NEADsegs of
length 8, 10 and 11 were offered, but no segment longer
than a NEADseg-7 was successful. The offer and 1-way
success rates of cycles was 14.5 and 12.4%, compared to
26.6 and 17.4% for NEAD segments. This represents a
second round of natural selection that, overall, led to NEAD
segments producing over twice as many transplants as
cycles (133 vs. 61), despite the fact that segmentswere not
actively pursued over cycles.
Partially completed NEAD segments
To better quantify the number of transplants performed
through partially completed NEAD segments, the originally
intended NEADseg lengths were compared to the final
completed lengths (Table 2). A total of 101 transplants were
performed from 58 NEADseg offers that were completed to
their originally intended length. An additional 32 transplants
were performed from 15 NEADseg offers that did not reach
their originally intended length 70 NEADseg-4, -5, -6, and -7
were offered, of which only 13 resulted in transplants.
Although only four of these thirteen segments reached their
intended length (three NEADseg-4, one NEADseg-6), the
remaining nine generated an additional 24 transplants of final
lengths1, 2, 3, and6. In contrast,whenone transplant failed in
simultaneous cycles, the entire offer was always retracted.
The reasons for failure in simultaneous cycles and
NEAD segments
The reasons for failure were documented from 2008
through 2014. During this period, the total number of
offers was 358, which included 978 1-ways resulting in 181
completed transplants. Of the 358 offers made during this
period, 266 offers (74%) failed to result in any transplants.
Out of 978 1-ways, 797 failed (81.5%), both from the 266
completely failed offers as well as from partially completed
Figure 1: Proportion of pool recipients with a PRA 80% (left
series), and proportion of transplanted recipients with a PRA
80% (right series) stratified by year. * p-value between pool
PRA in 2007 and 2014 <0.001.
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NEADsegs. Of the failed 1-ways, 308 failed for a specific
identifiable reason (Table S3), and 489 failed due to
dependency on preceding 1-ways (failures of dependency).
Three reasons for failure have occurred predictably, and
were thus potentially preventable: (i) positive crossmatch;
(ii) transplant center declined donor for medical reasons;
and (iii) transplant center failed to deactivate donor trans-
planted outside the APD. These three MRFs accounted for
59% of all reasons for failure (Figure 4).
Eras of the APD
Modifications to software and protocols over time can be
divided into four distinct ‘‘eras’’ of the APD. Each era is
characterized by a new strategy, software update and/or
protocol modification in an attempt to improve efficacy and
minimize the impact of MRFs without increasing the
workload for transplant centers. Figure 5 shows the era,
MRFs identified from the previous era, modifications and
how these modifications impacted the success rate and
reasons for failure.
Though the reasons for failure were not systematically
collected, the predominant reasons for failure in 2007
(Era 1) were positive crossmatch, software that was limited
to identifying only 2-way exchanges, and inefficiencies in
coordination between the APD and participating transplant
centers. Starting in 2008 (Era 2), when failure data began to
Figure 2: Transplants performed by APD. (A) Number of transplants performed through cycles stratified by cycle length and year.
(B) Number of transplants performed through NEAD segments stratified by intended chain length and year. (C) Cumulative chains divided
into NEAD chain segments. Black bars indicate portions of chains completed by other centers in conjunction with the APD.
Figure 3: Offers, transplants, and success rates. One-way and
offer success rate by year graphed with number of transplants
performed by year. &: Projected 2014 transplants based on 25
completed transplants as of August 30, 2014.
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be systematically collected, a centralized tissue-typing
laboratory was initiated, and the matching software was
modified to collect more complete donor HLA information
(e.g. Cw and DQ b antigen identification became mandato-
ry), and more specific recipient unacceptable HLA informa-
tion. Additionally in Era 2, an improved matching algorithm
allowed the identification of an optimized, nonoverlapping
solutionwhere the total number of potential transplants per
chain could be limited to a length of 2, 3, 4, or unrestricted.
While we did not prospectively evaluate an alternative,
employing these strategies in Era 2 reduced positive
crossmatch as a reason for failure (31–11%, p¼ 0.007).
An improvement in success rate (5–19%, p< 0.001) was
also observed, though the number of transplants/year did
not increase significantly 13–14tx/yr.
By the end of Era 2, it became apparent that offers were
failing because transplant centers were consistently
rejecting potential donors for reasons that could have
been specified and accounted for prospectively. Era 3 saw
the creation of discretionary exclusion factors that, once
incorporated into the software, precluded exchanges
containing the prospective donors that transplant centers
would have eventually rejected. The APD also incorporated
the optimization software developed by Roth, S€onmez, and
€Unver, directly into the web-based application, allowing the
execution of match runs by APD staff as frequently as
necessary (24). The ability to rapidly repeat failed match
Figure 4: Reasons for failure classified into 3 modifiable
categories and 1 nonmodifiable category.





Rows show the intended lengths,while columns show the final completed lengths. Top: number of offers. Bottom: number
of transplants that resulted.
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runs resulted in a higher offer turnover (31–56 offers/year),
leading to a decreased success rate overall, but we
observed an increased number of transplants/year by
nearly 85% 14–26tx/yr. Failures due to transplant centers
rejecting donors remained relatively unchanged (18–19%),
while positive crossmatch failures increased significantly
(11–29%, p¼ 0.014).
In Era 4 the APD began to show transplant centers multiple
combinations of donor-recipient exchanges prior to making
formal offers. These potential combinations, which could
have been arranged into a large number of overlapping
optimized solutions, were then vetted by the clinical teams,
allowing them to decline combinations prospectively, thus
improving the certitude of the compatibility matrix that was
then used to generate the single best optimized non-
overlapping solution. Following these modifications we
observed a decrease in the 1-way failures from transplant
centers rejecting donors from 19 to 15%, though this
change was not statistically significant (p¼ 0.12). The
success rate improved (14–21%, p¼ 0.014), and the
number of transplants/year increased by an additional
37% (26–33tx/yr).
Discussion
To be successful, KPD programs must overcome different
barriers. While large donor/recipient pools increase the
probability of finding a matching donor for each patient,
especially for highly sensitized patients, large pools require
efficient cooperation between often geographically and
philosophically diverse transplant centers. When trying to
coordinate exchanges between multiple transplant cen-
ters, each with its own policies and agendas, failures in the
matching process lead to frustration and mistrust of the
KPD search process. It is not surprising that the KPD
program with the highest volume of transplants in the
United States operates as a single center, in which
coordinated efforts with a unified goal allows failures to
be corrected swiftly and efficiently (16).
A KPD program overseeing multiple diverse transplant
centers requires tolerance, transparency and muted
expectations, accepting that many attempts may be
necessary until a successful solution is found. The
organization overseeing a multicenter KPD program should
develop efficient software and policies that mimic the best
practices of a single center approach, recognizing that a
single center approach limits overall patient access to
KPD (25). Indeed, while being cognizant of the fact that
there are real barriers that must be accommodated when
working with diverse transplant centers, the search for
matches needs to be timely and fair. In reviewing the APD
process, it has become clear that factors other than the
matching algorithm play a role in generating successful
offers. The APD has not only developed and improved its
software, but also adjusted its policies on HLA reporting,
specifying acceptable donor criteria and incorporating
recipient preferences to minimize efforts from participating
transplant centers, while maximizing opportunities for
patients to find a matching donor.
Figure 5: Eras of the APD showing problems identified, solutions, and the impact of modifications on the reasons for failure,
1-way success rate, and transplants/year. *Upon reviewing laboratory data, 26 positive crossmatcheswere found in 2007 that accounted
for 31% of the 83 failed offers. However, because all failure data was not systematically collected in 2007, these 26 XM failures were not
incorporated into the overall failure analysis.
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Evaluation of Era 1 revealed that many offers failed due to
positive crossmatches, which was substantially decreased
in Era 2. In Era 3, the failures due to positive crossmatch
increased from 11 to 29%. We hypothesize that this
reflected an attempt to perform Luminex-based bead
crossmatching with solubilized donor cells. Due to the
clear lack of efficacy for detecting HLA class II-specific
antibodies, bead crossmatching was replaced by flow
crossmatching in Era 4. Era 4 also saw the initiation of
desensitization attempts by transplants centers, which led
to more frequent positive crossmatches, as well as the use
of endothelial crossmatch by some centers. These three
changes may have accounted for the increased positive
crossmatch failures. Another contributing factormay be the
increasing prevalence of highly sensitized recipients in the
pool, which has been predicted and described by other
registries and also holds true for the APD (26). Indeed, the
number of pool recipients with a PRA80% has increased
from 31.7% in 2007 to 48.9% in 2014 (Figure 1). In an effort
to generate transplants for highly sensitized patients, we
inevitably had to crossmatch more highly sensitized
candidates, which has likely led to an increase in positive
crossmatches. While the number of transplanted patients
is not large enough to prove causality, the percent of
transplanted patients with a PRA  80% has increased
from 15.4% in 2007 to 36.0% in 2014.
The APD developed a centralized tissue-typing lab and
standardized the required data elements for HLA typing and
unacceptable antigens. The centralized lab freezes donor
lymphocytes and candidate serum so that, when feasible
transplants are identified, crossmatches can be run
immediately without requiring the shipment of blood.
National KPD programs in the Netherlands, Canada and
Australia also utilize centralized tissue-typing laborato-
ries (7,27,28). Though amelioration of positive crossmatch
failures has not been consistent, developing standardized
tissue typing protocols and retaining recipient and donor
blood samples for future crossmatches has improved the
efficient, simultaneous evaluation of easy-to-match donors
with multiple highly sensitized candidates.
A 2012 KPD consensus conference provided recommended
guidelines for histocompatibility testing, and suggested that,
by correlating antibody assays with transplant center risk
criteria, the goal for KPD virtual crossmatching is to achieve
95% accuracy in laboratory crossmatch prediction (13). A
preliminary analysis shows that the APD virtual crossmatch
false negative rate was 19% in 2009 and displayed a
downward trendeachyear, endingwith 7% in2014 (data not
shown), consistentwith recent literature (29–31).Withmore
extensive HLA typing, such as adding DQa and DPb, it may
be possible to reduce false negative virtual crossmatches,
but this may come at the expense of eliminating possible
transplant opportunities due to positive virtual crossmatches
that would not have negatively impacted the clinical
outcome. Gombos et al note the challenge of false positive
virtual crossmatches limiting viable transplant opportunities;
the APD uses the concept of amenable antigens to allow
individual centers to specify which DSA are not clinically
relevant (32). This balance between reducing both false
negative and false positive virtual crossmatches remains an
area of active research interest.
Softwaremodificationshavebeengeared toward twodistinct
endpoints: improving the quality of information collected and
processed to improve thecompatibilitymatrix, andminimizing
the time required to progress from a match run output to
successful transplants. By the end of Era 2, it was apparent
that transplant centerswere rejecting donors for reasons that
were not consistent across centers. For instance, one center
would not accept a donor if there was more than a six-inch
height discrepancywith the recipient,whichwas not the case
with any other center. The development of discretionary
exclusion factors allowed center-specific information to be
incorporated into the algorithm.
However, not unexpectedly, transplant centers have
sometimes relaxed their exclusion criteria to avoid the
possibility of denying a donor they might actually accept.
For example, a center might normally exclude any donors
over the age of 65, but would accept a 65-year-old donor
who presented a zero-antigenmismatch and excellent renal
function. Consequently, that transplant center might relax
their exclusion criterion in all cases, to avoid unknowingly
excluding one acceptable exception. The introduction of
combinations in Era 3 allowed transplant centers to accept
or reject potential donors in advance of a formal offer, thus
allowing the APD the opportunity to develop a more
accurate compatibility matrix.
In comparing cycles versus NEAD chains, it is important to
note that the algorithm did not actively choose chains over
cycles, but only sought to optimize either the quantity or
quality of transplants. The predominance of NEAD chains
over simple cycles represents two rounds of natural
selection. First, chains and cycles freely competed in the
optimization process, wherein the algorithm optimized
quantity or quality by utilizing chains in 61% of offers. In the
second round, the ability of chains to generate transplants
in partially completed offers, whereas cycles were required
to be fully completed, resulted in chains being responsible
for 69%of the total transplants. Thus, chains offer a distinct
advantage over cycles.
As can be seen in Table S2, cycles/chain segments fewer
than four exchanges in length have had a much higher
success rate. Though several longer chain segments were
successful, Table 2 shows that a majority of long segments
failed before completion, such that 83% of ‘‘final’’ seg-
ments were 1, 2, or 3 transplants in length. The APD has
never completed an entire set of offers comprising a single
optimized solution as first suggested by the computer
output. That being said, the APD has been able to
successfully build long chains not from a single optimized
match run, but by taking advantage of the ability of BDs to
Fumo et al
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extend NEAD chains over time. Had chain segments been
immediately directed to the deceased donor waitlist, only
59 transplantswith amaximum chain length six would have
been achieved (Figure 2c, segment 1). While some of the
excluded recipients would have been transplanted through
other offers, our results suggest that nonsimultaneous
chains achieve more transplants than an approach that
relies on a single match run with no BDs.
If KPD registries could build optimal solutions from a
perfect compatibility matrix, the 1-way and offer success
rates would be 100%. Until then, KPD registries have
focused on one or both of two strategies: attempt to
minimize the time from offer to failure so that many offers
can be extended in as little time as possible until a
successful offer is identified, or focus on building systems
that improve the accuracy of the compatibility matrix
before an offer is made, so that fewer offers fail. The first
strategy requires rapid-fire offers, and the second
strategy requires time to build a better compatibility
matrix. In the United States, competing kidney exchange
programs employ both of these strategies. In countries
such as the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia
where single national KPD programs exist, only the
second strategy is used (7,27,28,33). As long as the
United States has competing registries that utilize the first
approach, and patients enroll in more than one registry,
efforts to improve the second approach will not be
possible because 1-way failures due to competing offers
from systems that employ the first strategy will prevent
the second strategy from reaching its fullest potential.
While transplants in competing registries benefit the
patient transplanted, the other recipients involved in the
failed offer will have experienced a delay in finding a donor
because time was spent creating an offer with pairs that
are not truly available. This inefficiency overall may reduce
the total number of transplants achieved nationally.
On the whole, the diversity in strategies employed by the
different KPD registries has been instrumental in the
evolution of KPD in the United States. However, it is clear
that the next phase in the process is the creation of a
national registry (9,13–15). Lessons learned through
analyzing 7 years of APD efforts raise important philosophi-
cal questions with respect to a national registry. While
the U.S. performed 588 KPD transplants in 2013, a recent
article predicts that 1600 KPD transplants are possible per
year in the U.S. (34,35). In order to achieve this end, the
strategy adopted by a national registry should incorporate
the best aspects of current KPD programs. The process of
generating the compatibilitymatrix used should incorporate
as much information as possible so that it will be an
accurate reflection of reality, and time should be spent
creating the most robust offers possible. Tissue typing
should be standardized and streamlined. Offers should be
reviewed as expediently as possible, and transplant centers
should be transparent and forgiving in their dealings with
the KPD registry.
Finally, perhaps the biggest barrier to KPD success in
the U.S. is not an issue that can be resolved by software or
process changes. A recent article byMassie et al, suggests
that an additional 1000 KPD transplants could be performed
per year, and in agreement with a recent national
consensus conference, identified financial barriers as one
of the biggest obstacles to expanding KPD (13,34).
Overcoming financial barriers would allow more centers
to participate and more incompatible pairs to be enrolled,
thus increasing the available pool size and allowing more
patients to receive KPD transplants. To address this issue,
several authors have suggested a national KPD ‘‘standard
acquisition charge’’ approach, and the Alliance for Paired
Donation recently received an Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) grant to pilot such a
project (13,15,36–38).
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Additional Supporting Information may be found in the
online version of this article.
Table S1: Variables used in scoring rubric and the values
associated with each. This rubric has been amended
periodically by the APD’s Scientific Operations Committee,
comprised of physicians from participating transplant
centers. Last amended 02/2014. *Y¼Years since recipient
was registered. N¼Number of recipients currently in pool.
R¼ Rank in the list of recipients when they are put in order
from the person with the most recent registration date to
the person with the earliest registration date.
Table S2: Offers, transplants, and success rates by length
of cycle or NEAD segment.
Table S3: Major categories of reasons for failure (row 1)
and subcategories (rows 2–9).
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